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The Small Plan Audit Program: 
The Opinions of the Court 
Arnold F. Shapiro* 
Abstract 
One of the most important issues of recent years from the perspective of many pen-
sion actuaries is the IRS's small plan audit program. The program initially was 
expected to raise two-thirds of a billion dollars by targeting well-funded defined bene-
fit plans with five or fewer participants. The focus of the audit was the assumed 
interest rate and the normal retirement age, both of which the IRS generally regarded 
as too low. 
While the focus of the audit was relatively narrow, the issue it raised was a 
funda mental one. The basic question was the extent to which the IRS could impose its 
unilateral interpretation of actuarial principles on pension actuaries. 
Not surprising, many small plan audit cases ended in the tax courts. In due course 
decisions and opinions have been rendered in three lead cases. This article presents the 
opinions of these cases as they relate to actuarial practice and discusses some of their 
implications. 
Key words and phrases: defined benefit plans, actuarial assumptions, unit credit method, 
IRS 
1 Introduction 
One of the most important issues of recent years from the perspec-
tive of many pension actuaries is the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) 
small plan audit program. 1 The program began in November 1989, 
when the IRS2 initiated a nationwide plan to audit the actuarial 
assumptions of approximately 18,000 small well-funded defined bene-
* Arnold Shapiro, Ph.D., F.5.A., is Professor of Actuarial Science and Insurance, Robert 
G. Schwartz Faculty Fellow, and director of the Risk Management Research Center at 
Penn State University. He serves as editor of Actuarial Research Clearing House and 
associate editor of Insurance: Mathematics and Economics. 
1 Even though this paper deals only with court cases in the United States, the opinion 
of the court may have implications in any country where actuarial assumptions are at 
issue. 
2 Throughout this paper, the abbreviation IRC means the Internal Revenue Code and 
the abbreviation IRS refers to the Internal Revenue Service of the U.s. 
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fit pension plans. The program initially was expected to raise two-
thirds of a billion dollars in additional tax revenue. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The specific plans to be audited shared several characteristics: 
The plan year ended in 1986, 1987, or 1988;3 
The plan covered one to five participants; 
The plan annual contribution generally, but not always, was 
$100,000 or more; 
The plan was valued with an interest assumption of less than 8 
percent (IRS memo, November 29, 1989); and 
The normal retirement age of the plan was less than age 65. 
It was estimated that deductions would be disallowed retroactively 
in 85 percent of the plans to be examined. 
The program fell considerably short of its expectations. Although 
all the audits under the program were concluded by July 31, 1992, 
only $38 million in revenue had been produced by December 1992, and 
the program appeared to be floundering; see the BNA Pension 
Reporter (1992). In retrospect this is not surprising because the effort 
immediately met intense and unrelenting resistance from small plan 
actuaries, their associations, and their advocates. 
It was not long after the small plan audit program was instituted 
before several of the ensuing cases reached the tax court. These cases 
were assigned to Judge Charles E. Clapp II, who, after observing that 
there were likely to be many more such cases, selected some represen-
tative ones for trial. His stated intent was to develop judicial prece-
dence and guidance so that subsequent cases could be resolved without 
costly litigation. 
The suits comprise two institutional and eight noninstitutional 
cases. The two institutional cases, the first to be tried, involved large 
successful law firm partnerships that had adopted individmll 
defined benefit (IDB) plans for their partners.4 The firms were the 
Texas-based firm of Vinson & Elkins and the New York firm of 
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (Wachtell Lipton). In both 
instances, assumptions used for valuing their plans were deemed 
3 These plan years were chosen because the statute of limitations was ended for plan 
years pnor to 1986 (IRe §6S01) and the tax law changed for plan years that ended 
after 1988. The primary relevant changes in the tax law were the revision of the full-
funding limitation to include current liability (IRe §412(b)(S),(c)(7) and (1)(7» and the 
amendment to IRe §412(c)(3), which requires that each actuarial assumption (rather 
than actuarial assumptions in the aggregate) be reasonable. 
4 In view of IRe §401(a)(26), individual defined benefit plans of this type no longer 
are allowed, and these plans have been terminated. 
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unreasonable by the IRS, which sought to disallow their deductions. 
These cases were tried in January 1992, and a decision was handed 
down the following July. 
The remainder of the cases involved a variety of small busi-
nesses, each of which had a small defined benefit pension plan for 
one or two key employees. Because the cases arose under an audit 
program in Phoenix, they came to be known as the Phoenix cases, but 
subsequently were referred to as Citrus Valley because they were con-
solidated and tried as Citrus Valley Estates, Inc. et a1.5 These cases 
involved frontloading of the contribution under the unit credit funding 
method in addition to actuarial assumption challenges. The cases 
were tried in February 1992, and a decision was handed down the fol-
lowing September. 
This article presents the opinions of the court as they relate to 
the actuarial practice associated with small defined benefit plans 
and discusses some of their implications. First, the actuarial issues 
contested by the IRS are summarized. Then the opinions of the court 
relating to these issues are discussed. The paper ends with a comment 
on the implications of the court's opinions. 
2 The Actuarial Issues Contested by the IRS 
The general actuarial issue raised by the IRS was whether actu-
arial assumptions used by the enrolled actuary to determine the 
plans' costs were reasonable in the aggregate and represented the 
actuary's best estimate of anticipated experience under the plans as 
required by IRe §412(c)(3). The specific issues contested by the IRS 
are summarized in Table 1.6 For example, for the Vinson & Elkins 
plans the IRS contested the 5 percent preretirement and post-
retirement interest rate assumption, the normal retirement age of 62, 
the 5 percent postretirement expense load, and the preretirement mor-
tality assumption. Moreover, the IRS contended that these assump-
tions were not offset by any other assumptions that would make the 
assumptions reasonable in the aggregate. 
5 Citrus Valley Estates, Inc. , Robert J. and Janice A. Davis, Old Frontier Investment, 
Inc., Lear Eye Clinic, Ltd., Robert Stephan, Jr., Ltd., Boren Steel Consultants, Inc., 
Arizona Orthopedic Institute of Traumatic and Reconstructive Surgery, Jonathan R. and 
Renee K. Fox, and Brody Enterprises, Inc. Although separately docketed, Arizona 
~rthopedic is a successor to Jonathan Fox. 
This paper does not deal with the nonactuarial issues of these cases, which included 
timing of amendments, automatic approval of a cost method change, and validation of 
hours worked. 
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Most of the issues of Table 1 are self-evident,7 but those related 
to the mortality tables and the cost methods need clarification. For 
the institutional cases, the lOB plans that contained life insurance 
used the 1958 Commissioners Standard Ordinary (CSO) mortality 
table for the preretirement mortality assumption and the 1971 
Individual Annuity Mortality (lAM) table for the postretirement 
mortality assumption. While the IRS agreed that such plans may 
provide a preretirement death benefit and may fund these benefits 
using envelope funding,S it contested the use of the 1958 CSO table on 
the grounds that it grossly overstated the expected actual mortality 
experience. 
TABLE 1 
Actuarial Issues Contested by the IRS 
Interest Rate Mortality 
Expenses Table Cost 
Pre Post NRA Pre Post Pre Post Method 
Vinson & Elkins 5% 5% 62 5% ..J 
Wachtell Lipton 5% 5% 55 7.5% 5/7.5% ..J 
Citrus Valley et a/. 
Citrus Valley 5% 5% 
Davis 5% 5% 55 
Old Frontier 5% 5% 
Lear Eye Clinic 5% 5% 55 ..J 
Robert Stephan 5% 5% 55 ..J 
Boren Steel 5% 5% 
Arizona Orthopedic 5% 5% 55 ..J ..J 
Fox 5% 5% 55 ..J ..J 
Brody Enterprises 5% 5% 55 6/4.5% ..J ..J 
7 Some of these plans could be differentiated only on the basis of their credible experi-
ence. It had been anticipated that the court's decision would be affected materially by 
plan experience, but this turned out not to be the case. 
S The envelope method may be used with any cost method and with any type of 
insurance policy. It is the method that generally is used with the unit credIt funding 
method or with insurance policies that do not have guaranteed projected cash values 
at retirement. Under the envelope method, assets are adjusted by adding the cash 
value of the insurance as of the valuation date. The normal cost and accrued liability 
are calculated using the adjusted assets. 
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The situation in Citrus Valley was somewhat different. In one 
instance, an insurance company's guaranteed female annuity table was 
used for a plan with a single male participant; in another, a female 
mortality table with a seven year age setback was used for a plan 
with a single male participant; and in another, an age setback was 
used for a participant with a substandard family medical history. 
The IRS contested the mortality assumption in each instance. 
The IRS contested the actuarial cost method in a significant num-
ber of the Citrus Valley cases. The issue was straightforward. These 
plans provided for the accrual of all, or a significant portion, of the 
benefits provided under the plan in a very few years, a procedure 
commonly referred to as frontloading. Using the unit credit funding 
method, the benefits then were funded as they accrued with the con-
tribution currently deductible. The IRS contended that while front-
loading of benefit accruals is permissible from a qualification stand-
point, an equivalent frontloading of the deductible contribution is not 
permitted and that no more than 10 percent of the maximum benefit 
may be allocated to a given year's normal cost, just as the maximum 
benefit that can be provided to a participant with one year of service 
is 10 percent of the overall IRC §415 limit. 
3 The Experts 
Before proceeding to the findings of the court, it is worth noting 
the credentials of the experts chosen by each side and the focus of 
their testimony or report. 
3.1 The Institutional Cases 
The experts for institutional cases included James F. Rabenhorst, 
managing partner at Price Waterhouse, who testified regarding the 
retirement age assumption; Richard R. Joss, Ph.D., F.S.A., M.A.A.A, 
E.A., resource actuary for the Wyatt Company, who testified regard-
ing the actuarial assumptions; Mary S. Riebold, F.S.A., M.A.A.A., 
E.A., F.C.A., managing director for Mercer and then-president of the 
Conference of Consulting Actuaries, who testified regarding the actu-
arial assumptions; Steven H. Schechter, director of management 
information systems at Wolper Ross, who testified regarding interest 
rate assumptions based on an analysis of Form 5500 data; and John W. 
Peavy III, Ph.D., C.F.A., professor of finance at Southern Methodist 
University, who served to rebut the contentions of Shapiro and 
Haneberg regarding the interest rate assumption. 
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The experts for the IRS in these cases included Ronald L. 
Haneberg, J.D., F.S.A., M.A.A.A., F.CA., previously a consulting 
actuary with Buck Consultants, who testified regarding the actuarial 
assumptions; Claude Poulin, F.S.A., M.A.A.A., E.A., president of 
Poulin Associates, Inc., who testified regarding the actuarial assump-
tions; Alan C Shapiro, Ph.D., professor of banking and finance at the 
University of Southern California, who testified regarding the inter-
est rate; William S. Borden, Ph.D., senior program analyst at 
Mathematica Policy Research, who testified regarding the invest-
ment return and in rebuttal to Joss; and Jeffrey F. Jaffe, M.B.A., Ph.D., 
associate professor of finance at the Wharton School, who provided 
an expert report on the validity of the interest rate assumption. 
3.2 Citrus Valley Estates, Inc. et al. 
The experts for Citrus Valley included Kenneth D. Klingler, 
F.s.A., M.A.A.A., E.A., a consulting actuary with the Wyatt 
Company, who testified regarding the assumptions; and Arthur W. 
Anderson, A.S.A., M.A.A.A., E.A., who previously had been a consul-
tant for William M. Mercer, Johnson & Higgins, and the Wyatt 
Company and was the author of Pension Mathematics for Actuaries, 
testified as an expert with respect to the unit credit funding method. 
The experts for the IRS included J. Ruben Rigel, J.D., F.S.A., 
F.CA., M.A.A.A., E.A., who testified with respect to the assump-
tions and the unit credit funding method; Roger Ibbotson, M.B.A., 
Ph.D., president and chief executive officer of Ibbotson & Associates, 
Inc., who testified with respect to the interest rate assumption; 
William S. Borden, Ph.D., who testified with respect to the interest 
rate and retirement age assumption; and James E. Holland, A.S.A., 
E.A., chief of the Pension Actuarial Branch of the Service, who pro-
vided an expert report dealing with the unit credit funding method. 
4 The Findings of the Tax Court 
The court generally found against the IRS on most of the issues. In 
the institutional cases, for example, the court held that "[t]he actu-
arial assumptions made by the plans' enrolled actuary were reason-
able in the aggregate and represented the actuary's best estimate of 
anticipated experience under the plans, as required by §412(c)(3); 
accordingly, as the assumptions used were not substantially unreason-
able, [the IRS] is precluded from requiring a retroactive change of 
assumptions. " 
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The court held similarly for the noninstitutional cases that all of 
the challenged actuarial assumptions for each of the plans at issue 
were reasonable. Further, the certifying actuaries for the plans using 
the unit credit funding method funded within allowable limits and 
made reasonable allocations of costs, except for one plan that was 
complicated because of an amendment issue (Citrus Valley, p. 101). 
Accordingly, the actuarial assumptions and methods used for the 
plans were reasonable in the aggregate. A fortiori, these assumptions 
were not substantially unreasonable in order to permit retroactive 
changes of assumptions for years prior to the year in which the audit 
was made. 
The outcomes of the cases were not obvious prior to the decisions. 
It is interesting and informative to read how an unbiased legal 
authority interprets the actuarial issues involved. The following is a 
recapitulation of how the court reached its conclusions. 
4.1 Deference to the Enrolled Actuary 
A major conclusion was that deference must be given to the 
assumptions chosen by the enrolled actuary who certifies the funding 
of the plan. In this regard, Judge Clapp gave his interpretation of 
Congressional intent the full weight of legal authority. 
Judge Clapp emphasized that Congress was aware in enacting 
ERISA that actuaries would playa major role in ensuring that retire-
ment plans would be sufficiently able to provide retirement income 
when due. He observed that Congress recognized the importance of 
the actuarial assumptions and the cost methods chosen by actuaries 
in determining plan funding amounts and that Congress explicitly 
noted that such determinations by actuaries would involve making 
predictions and would be a matter of judgment involving many factors 
and producing a range of results. He also commented that Congress 
decided that accepting a range of reasonableness for funding amounts 
for retirement plans would be more desirable and more effective than 
imposing an inflexible legislative standard on actuaries and, there-
fore, rejected imposing mandatory funding assumptions and methods 
(Wachtell Lipton, pp. 10-11). 
4.2 The Interest Rate Assumption 
In reaching his decision on the interest rate assumption, Judge 
Clapp identified what he regarded as particularly important fac-
tors. He noted that the combination of these factors weighed heavily 
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in favor of concluding that 5 percent was reasonable. For the institu-
tional plans these factors were (Vinson & Elkins, p. 46): 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The nature of the responsibility Congress entrusted to enrolled 
actuaries in the statutory scheme enacted for defined benefit pen-
sion plans; 
The conservative nature of the actuarial assumption selection pro-
cess; 
The fact that IDB plans were long-term plans, with funding to 
occur over a 30 year to 50 year period; 
The fact that IDB plans were self-directed, with each partici-
pant being a co-acfministrator,9 especially because most of the 
IDB plans did not employ a professional manager; 
The fact that IDB plans lacked credible experience with respect 
to earnings, investment strategies, and otherwise; 
The risk of losing compounded earnings in a tax-exempt trust asso-
ciated with using overly optimistic assumptions and the resulting 
requirement for unanticipated higher contributions in later years; 
The relative closeness of all the actuarial experts' reasonable 
ranges;lO and 
The fact that most actuaries used interest rate assumptions of 
between 5 percent and 6 percent for small plans during the years 
at issue.ll 
He listed the same factors, except for the relative closeness of the 
reasonable ranges, for the noninstitutional plans (Citrus Valley, p. 69). 
Judge Clapp also clarified the role of a prudent actuary in the 
selection of the interest assumption. He noted that the actuary's pri-
mary duty to plan participants under ERISA is to establish a realis-
tic contribution pattern over the long term so that the plan sponsor 
will provide adequate funding for the ultimate pension obligation. 
Thus, prudent actuaries maintain a long-term conservative view that 
9 It is relevant that each partner/participant served as a coadministrator because that 
meant that the plan assets of the IDB prans were not commingled for the purpose of 
investment and, therefore, could not realize the rates of return earned by larger plans. 
10 Not all the experts agreed that their reasonable ranges were close. See, for 
example, Ronald 1. Haneberg, "Not All Experts Agree," Enrolled Actuaries Report 
(November, 1992), p. 3. 
11 This conclusion follows from Schechter's testimony that actuaries established 
interest rate assumptions between 5 percent and 6 percent for 1986 plans with fewer 
than 100 participants for 76.6 percent of the preretirement assumptions and 82.5 percent 
of the postretirement assumptions. Schechter's conclusions were based on his analysis 
of data obtained from the Department of Labor. 
The court was not swayed by the IRS's contention that rates in general use during 
the time were irrelevant. 
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will ensure benefit security for plan participants in selecting actuar-
ial assumptions (Vinson & Elkins, p. 27) 
Rejecting the IRS's contention that 8 percent would have been a 
reasonable interest rate assumption because that amount could have 
been earned during the years at issue, the court commented that 
"Congress did not entrust the nation's tax-advantaged retirement sav-
ings system to hypothetical returns that the markets 'should' bear" 
(Vinson & Elkins, p. 49). 
Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the court attached only 
minor importance to the testimony and reports of nonactuaries, in 
spite of the fact that they were experts in the field of investment. 
This was true, for example, even with the testimony of the well-
known Roger Ibbotson.12 The rationale was that these persons were 
not actuaries and that conclusions they drew would have limited 
application in the determination of the reasonableness of actuarial 
assumptions (Vinson & Elkins, p. 47). The court reasoned that if a 
financial analyst's predicted rate is higher than the actual rate 
earned, the investor simply earns less than expected, whereas if an 
actuary makes the same mistake, there is a significant risk that the 
plan will become underfunded and the pensioners' full benefits will 
be unpaid (Citrus Valley, p. 71). 
4.3 Retirement Age Assumption 
The court seemed willing to accept a normal retirement age 
(NRA) assumption that was less than age 65 as long as it was based 
on reasons that were "sincere, credible, and reasonable." It explicitly 
rejected the IRS's argument that statements by the participant in a 
one person plan were merely self-serving, even when there was no 
evidence that the underlying reasons had been explained to the plan 
actuary. (See, for example, Citrus Valley, p. 83.) 
The IRS took the position that failure of a key participant to 
retire at the assumed normal retirement age was clear evidence that 
the assumption was unreasonable. In rejecting this position, the court 
noted that" ... the certifying actuary is not charged with the respon-
sibility of determining when a plan participant will actually begin 
to receive the plan benefits. That would be an impossible task. 
Further, the fact that a plan participant might choose to, or actually 
does, delay receipt of the plan benefits beyond the assumed retire-
12 Ibbotson & Associates, Inc. sells financial software and data and provides consulting 
services to investment management firms. Roger Ibbotson is an often-quoted authority on 
stocks, bonds, Treasury bills, and inflation. 
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ment age does not make the retirement age assumption unreasonable. 
An actuary is charged with looking into the future and making a 
determination as to, among other things, when benefits under the 
plan could begin" (Vinson & Elkins, p. 58). 
Some of the Citrus Valley plans contained a segregated account 
provision, which meant that at the normal retirement age benefits 
were segregated into a separate account even if the participant chose 
to continue working beyond that age. The present value of accrued 
benefits at the normal retirement age is treated in effect as an 
account balance in a defined contribution plan. The experts of both 
parties agreed that the inclusion of a segregated account provision in 
a plan rendered the date of a participant's actual retirement irrele-
vant (Citrus Valley, p. 75). 
Given that the experts agreed, the court concluded that the segre-
gation provision justified the finding that it was reasonable for the 
assumed retirement age to be the normal retirement age stated in the 
plan, because that would be the age at which the participant would 
elect to segregate the accrued benefits. This obviated the retirement 
issue for a number of plans that had a normal retirement age of 55. 
4.4 Expense Loadings 
The court held for the taxpayer in each instance where the IRS 
challenged the expense loading. While Judge Clapp had some mis-
givings about the 7.5 percent expense loading in the institutional 
cases, he found it not to be substantially unreasonable and acceptable 
on the basis of reasonable in the aggregate. 
He rejected the IRS's argument in the noninstitutional cases that 
expense loading is merely a device to increase deductions. His opinion 
observed that "[the IRS] offered a rather perfunctory rebuttal, stat-
ing simply that [the] addition of postretirement expense load 
assumptions would further increase the funding goal and the amount 
of the deduction ... This is not, however, unreasonable per se, as [the 
IRS] seems to believe ... A postretirement expense load is a reason-
able manner in which to fund the postretirement administrative 
fees" (Citrus Valley, p. 91). 
4.5 Mortality Assumptions 
The court found that it was reasonable in the institutional cases 
to use the 1958 CSO mortality table to compute the cost of the pre-
retirement death benefit. It explicitly rejected the IRS's arguments 
that a preretirement mortality assumption was unreasonable in a one 
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person plan and that even if it were appropriate to use a preretire-
ment mortality assumption, it was unreasonable to assume the 1958 
CSO mortality table for the preretirement mortality and the 1971 
lAM table for the postretirement mortality for the same person 
because the tables are incompatible. As the court pointed out, the 
probability of the participant's preretirement death was not at issue. 
The issue was to estimate the life insurance premium expense, and 
this could be done best by using the same type of mortality table as 
would be used by the insurance company (Vinson & Elkins, p. 67). 
In the noninstitutional cases, while the court was "not entirely 
convinced that the mortality assumption ... is completely reasonable, 
it is not substantially unreasonable so as to justify a retroactive 
adjustment" (Citrus Valley, p. 87). Thus, even in situations as extreme 
as the case involving a male participant that used the 1983 lAM 
table for females with a seven year age setback, the mortality 
assumption implicitly was approved by the court in its approval of 
the funding assumptions in the aggregate. 
4.6 The Unit Credit Funding Method 
One of the surprises to emerge from the Citrus Valley cases was 
the court finding against the IRS on the frontloading issue under the 
unit credit funding method. The IRS previously had won the well-
publicized Mirza case (Jerome Mirza & Associates, Ltd. v. United 
States, 882 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1989)), where the same issue was in 
question and the same argument was used. In Mirza, the court agreed 
with the IRS's interpretation that IRC §404(a)(1)(A)(iii) provides 
that the maximum that can be deducted in any year is the "normal 
cost" plus an amount necessary to amortize "past service" and other 
supplementary cost over ten years, as determined under regulations 
prescribed by the Secretary. It reasoned that "[i]t is simply incon-
ceivable that Congress would take pains to provide for the amortiza-
tion of past service credits but intended to allow taxpayers to circum-
vent this requirement by the device of structuring their plans to 
accrue benefits in a single year" (Mirza, p. 232) 
Judge Clapp enumerated three reasons for rejecting the Mirza con-
clusion (Citrus Valley, pp. 104-105). First, "[t]he language of 
§404(a)(1)(A)(iii) setting forth the limit on deductible contributions 
used the conditional phrase 'if *** provided by the plan' when set-
ting forth the treatment for past service cost." Thus, there would be 
only a past service liability if it were provided by the plan. Second, 
"[d]espite [the IRS's] assertions to the contrary, there is no 
express[ed] or implied connection between the limitations of §415 and 
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any allocation under §1.412(c)(3)-1(e)(3)" (Citrus Valley, p. 99). That 
is, there is no requirement that the allocation between normal cost 
and past service liability be consistent with the limitations on bene-
fit accruals. Third, "the Unit Credit Funding Method-in connection 
with a career-average pay plan-inherently allocates benefits in a 
reasonable manner to the past and future years of service for which 
benefits accrued and will accrue." 
This finding is only relevant for plan years beginning prior to 
1987, as the approach discussed is not possible for plan years begin-
ning after December 31, 1986. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 amended 
§415(b )(5) so that the dollar limitation is phased in over the first 
ten years of participation in a plan rather than ten years of service 
with the plan sponsor. 
4.7 Evidentiary Matters 
The IRS consistently has objected to actuaries' use of its training 
manuals, audit guidelines, internal and external correspondence, and 
transcripts of speeches made by Service employees regarding the mat-
ters at issue in these cases. The court concluded (Vinson & Elkins, pp. 
75-77), however, that actuaries can take into account IRS documents 
that have been disseminated publicly because "they are part of the 
actuarial universe within which all actuaries must live, think, and 
work in arriving at their conclusions as to reasonableness and their 
best estimates regarding appropriate contributions." Moreover, actu-
aries can be guided by the speeches of high-ranking Service employ-
ees. 
One specific comment that had been referenced by many pension 
actuaries is the highly publicized transcript of the Ira Cohen speech 
at the 1986 Enrolled Actuaries meeting, wherein he stated that a 4 
percentage point corridor on either side of the prevailing long-term 
Treasury bond rate was within the reasonable range of interest rate 
assumptions. In spite of the fact that Cohen was the director of the 
Actuarial and Technical Division of the Service at the time of the 
speech, the IRS claimed that he had not spoken for the Service and, 
moreover, the speech was merely hearsay. The court disagreed with 
the IRS's position, and asserted that such a speech, heard by many 
actuaries and disseminated by publication to many more, is not 
hearsay, as long as the transcript is "true and correct." 
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5 Implications 
There seems to be a consensus among small plan attorneys that 
the opinions rendered in these cases are likely to be afforded consid-
erable credibility.13 Not only are they "lengthy, studious, and thor-
oughly analyzed," but they are based to a large extent on "factual 
conclusions," which makes them difficult to overturn; see Reish and 
Ashton (1992). Moreover, 14 of 15 participating tax court judges in the 
Phoenix cases concurred with the opinions. 
It is difficult to anticipate how the courts will react in future 
cases where the issues are similar, but the facts and circumstances are 
materially different. The following basic principles, however, seem 
to have emerged: 
• 
• 
• 
The intent of Congress is that deference should be given to the 
assumptions chosen by the enrolled actuary; 
While assumptions are required to be reasonable and Con~ress did 
not permit actuaries unfettered liberty,14 the pragmatIc test is 
that assumptions are not "substantially unreasonable;"15 and 
When formulating assumptions, it is appropriate for the actuary 
to be guided by the "sincere, credible, and reasonable" expecta-
tions of the plan sponsor and IRS documents and insights that 
have been publicly disseminated. 
In the past actuaries have struggled to formulate a workable 
interpretation of pension laws and regulations for small plans. In 
most cases, actuaries are not attorneys, however-while their inter-
pretation of these laws and regulations may have seemed reasonable 
to them, there has been a need for an authoritative unbiased inter-
pretation. These cases, with their scholarly exposition of the rules 
and regulations, have done much to help put things into perspective. 
References 
BNA Pension Reporter (December 7, 1992): 2159. 
13 See, for example, Katz, Harvey M., "A Death Knell for the Small-Plan Program," 
p. 1 and Reish, C. Frederick, and Bruce L. Ashton, "The Phoenix Tax Court Decisions: 
What the Taxpayers Won," p. 3. 
14 The court specifically noted that it was the intent of Congress that actuaries should 
not sell their expertise to achieve tax-desired results rather than prudent plan 
funding. 
15 It is worth noting that the two main assumptions considered (the interest rate and 
the retirement age) were argued successfully on an individual basis, rather than an 
aggregate basis, so that the conclusions reached are still appropriate. 
131 
Arnold F. Shapiro Small Plan Audit Program 
Citrus Valley Estates, Inc. et al. v. Commissioner, 99T.e. No. 21, No. 12900-89 etc., 
September 29,1992 
Haneberg, Ronald L. "Not All Experts Agree." Enrolled Actuaries Report (November 
1992): 3. 
Internal memorandum to IRS field agents dated November 29, 1989. 
Katz, Harvey M. "A Death Knell for the Small-Plan Program." Society of Actuaries' 
Pension Section News (December 1992): 1. 
Jerome Mirza & Associates, Ltd. v. United States, 882 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1989). 
Reish, e. Frederick and Ashton, Bruce L. "Actuarial Audits: The Tax Court Decisions." 
The Pension ActuanJ (August 1992): 5. 
Reish, e. Frederick and Ashton, Bruce L. "The Phoenix Tax Court Decisions: What the 
Taxpayers Won." The Pension Actllary (December 1992): 3. 
Vinson & Elkins v. Commissioner, US TC, 99 T.e. No.2, Nos. 120030-90, 12412-91, July 
14, 1992. 
Wachtell, Lipton et al. v. Commissioner, US TC, T.e. Memo. 1992-392, No. 14574-90, July 
14, 1992. 
Arnold F. Shapiro 
Penn State University 
409 Business Administration Building 
University Park, PA 16802 
132 
i s. 
j
